00:00:00DEAN RUSK: --look for prospects for survival. We could give an entire course
on that subject. So today I shall be talking in shorthand and leaving it to you
to fill out the paragraphs in whatever way you wish. In August 1945 I was a
Colonel in the Army serving in the Operations Division of the War Department
General Staff. And we were all busy preparing for an invasion of the main
islands of Japan. When the flash came in on the dropping of the atomic bomb on
Hiroshima, a Colonel of the regular Army at the desk next to mine said, "War has
turned upon itself and is devouring its own tail. From this time forward it will
make no sense for nations to try to settle their differences by means of war."
00:01:00An instinctive insight of a professional soldier. Years later, shortly after
President [John Fitzgerald] Kennedy was inaugurated, he sat down in the Cabinet
Room with four or five of his senior colleagues and a staff of experts, and we
spent much of a day going through an examination of the total effects of nuclear
war, both direct and indirect. It was an awesome experience. At the end of it
President Kennedy asked me to come back with him to the Oval Office to discuss
something, and as we walked through the door he, with a strange little look on
his face, said, "And we call ourselves the 'human race.'" As a small boy growing
up in the Presbyterian church I memorized and recited the Westminster Shorter
catechism. The first question in that catechism is "What is the chief end of
00:02:00man?" In the catechism it had a theological answer. But many years later during
the Cuban Missile Crisis, as I drove through the streets of Washington and saw
people walking along the sidewalks and driving past in their cars, I was sobered
by the thought that this first of all questions "What is the chief end of man?",
"What is life all about?", had become an operational question before the
governments of the world. I mention these things simply to say that my remarks
today will be based upon a deep and informed respect for the destructive power
of nuclear weapons: not in the kind of fear which can lead to panic and
00:03:00irrational judgments and conduct, but a total respect for the capabilities of
these weapons to destroy the human race. And I am glad that you have had the
chance to have some insights into what that means. The most important single
thing to me about this post-World War II period is the simple fact that in this
year of 1985 we have put behind us more than forty years since a nuclear weapon
has been fired in anger, despite many serious and sometimes dangerous crises we
have had since 1945.
That is a very important, simple, incontrovertible statement of fact. I mention
it to you as a partial antidote to much of the doomsday talk which we are
00:04:00hearing these days. Doomsday! Some of it comes from those who are trying to
support dramatic increases in our defense budget. Much of it comes from those
who are trying to organize various peace movements on the other side of the
political spectrum. Some of it comes from news media trying to create shock
effect in listeners and viewers. And some comes from occasional professors who
find it the fad and the fashion to cry, "Oh, my God!" This doomsday talk has to
be watched. Dr. Helen Caldecott, the Australian physician who has spent a good
deal of time in this country working with various anti-nuclear groups, said on
00:05:00television not long ago that it was a mathematical certainty that we would have
nuclear war within a very few years. Back in 1959 the well-known British writer
[Charles Percy] C.P. Snow wrote an article in which he assured us with
scientific accuracy that we would have nuclear war within ten years. In that
same year of 1959 Mr. Herman Kahn, the well-known head of the famous think tank
called the "Hudson Institute", wrote a massive volume on thermonuclear war. And
in that book he seemed to say that the human race would be lucky to get to the
year 1975. Doomsday! There seems to be some allergy among the news media about
talking about these forty years without nuclear weapons. A little over two years
00:06:00ago I was asked by Time magazine to do a little five-hundred word comment on
relations with the Soviet Union, along with a half-a-dozen other people. And in
my own little piece I remarked that we had put behind us thirty-eight years
since a nuclear weapon has been fired. For reasons that I still do not
understand the editors of Time wanted to take out that sentence. And I finally
told them that they could throw the whole thing in the wastebasket, but if they
used my little piece they would have to use it as I wrote it. And they finally
did. When ABC [American Broadcasting Company] was coming up on its program, "The
Day After," about a nuclear holocaust in our Midwest, I tried without success to
get a message through to their top brass urging them to have one of their top
00:07:00correspondents, like a Ted Koppel, come on at the very beginning of that program
to say three very simple things: One, this program was a dramatization and not a
prophecy. Second, that we had put behind us then thirty- eight years since a
nuclear weapon has been fired in anger. And third, that neither ABC nor anyone
else could put a finger on a real problem in the real world today which is
pointing toward nuclear war. But they didn't do it. Were they interested in
shock effect and ratings? Or what? So it comes as a surprise to a good many
young people to have this very simple fact about these forty years pointed out
to them. Some of our thinking is complicated by a good deal of nonsense.
And one of the purposes of a university is to help students discover nonsense
00:08:00when they run across it. I'll nominate a few candidates for your possible
interest. I do not believe it is worthwhile to talk about a limited nuclear war.
It's just possible that if the forces opposing each other along that central
line dividing Europe, that if they got involved in significant combat, and if
there was an exchange of three or four nuclear weapons in each direction, that
the two sides might immediately stop and reconsider the situation. But if that
fighting is prolonged on a major scale, and nuclear weapons are used in Europe,
then I am convinced myself, knowing something about what is called "crisis
00:09:00management," that their use would act like a rolling artillery barrage and move
on to a full nuclear exchange. And the attempt to limit such nuclear war would
be virtually impossible. I've heard it said, even by officials of the Defense
Department, that there can be such a thing as a prolonged nuclear war from which
one side might emerge with some kind of advantage. To me that is utter nonsense.
After all, it was [Nikita Sergeevich] Khrushchev who said that, "In the event of
a nuclear war, the living would envy the dead." Nonsense. Another candidate is
talk about counterforce strategy. And that has crept into some of our official
00:10:00speaking from time to time. Counterforce strategy: The idea behind that is that
if you aim your own missiles at the other fellow's military targets, that that
would send a message to him, and he would spare your own cities. Now the best
way to send a message is to get on the hotline or pick up the telephone and talk
to the other fellow on the other end of the line. Try to construct for yourself
the kind of conversation that that would involve. "Hello, Mr. Chairman, this is
the President. I just want to let you know that we have launched missiles at
military targets in the Soviet Union, but only military targets, so we hope that
you will spare our cities. How many? Well, we launched nine hundred. But you
know there could be some misfires, so let's say eight-hundred-and-eighty, plus
or minus. Which targets? Oh, your missile silos, your submarine bases in
00:11:00Murmansk and Vladivostok. Oh, by the way, Mr. Chairman, this conversation ought
to be short because as you know, Moscow is your central command and control
center, and I want to give you a few minutes to get down into your shelter. Mr.
Chairman? Hello? Are you there? Hello? Gee, Secretary [Caspar Willard]
Weinberger, that fellow hung up on me. I knew you couldn't trust him." Now, the
more you try to frame that message the more you are in the world of fantasy: a
fantasy that goes beyond the imagination. And I think we do not help ourselves
by exaggerating the accuracy of intercontinental missiles.
We call our missile accurate if it has a fifty percent chance of landing within
X-hundred yards of its target. I heard a congressman on television last year
00:12:00say, "That means you have to launch two missiles at every target." Well, the
congressman had never thrown dice. Because the second missile would have a fifty
percent change of hitting its target. And if you want to get to certainty, your
mathematicians will tell you you would have to go to infinity. And that's a heck
of a lot of missiles. A friend who is knowledgeable about these things said
three years ago that if we had a nuclear war with the Soviet Union, we could hit
Eniwetok with great accuracy because we have tested these missiles on a range
running from California to targets near Eniwetok. And we have made all the
adjustments over a period of time to manage to get the missiles pretty much
where they were aimed. But neither we nor the Soviet Union have ever fired
missiles into trajectories that would be involved in a nuclear exchange. We've
had no experience in it. And such trajectories would have to take into account
00:13:00the wobbling of the earth on its axis as it rotates. We would have to take into
account the geodetic problem of locating with pinpoint accuracy the very spot at
which these missile silos might exist on the earth's surface several thousands
of miles away, variations in the magnetic and gravitational fields of the earth,
weather conditions at point of launch, and weather conditions at point of
reentry. So I myself have the impression that we have given these
intercontinental missiles far too much credit for pinpoint accuracy in the event
of an exchange. I simply do not believe that even a Soviet force strike could
virtually wipe out our minuteman force in our silos out in the west. And that
exaggeration I think does not help very much. Now it seems to me that we have
00:14:00learned during these forty years that the fingers on the nuclear trigger are not
itchy, just waiting for a pretext on which to fire these dreadful weapons. Since
it is fashionable for us to be very self-critical on these things, if you have
doubt about that as far as the United States is concerned let me remind you that
we have taken almost six hundred thousand casualties in dead and wounded since
the end of World War II in support of collective security: and without firing
nuclear weapons. We have learned during that forty-year period that Soviet
leaders have no more interest in destroying Mother Russia than our own leaders
have in destroying our beloved America.
We have had time to reflect upon the fact that we and the Soviet Union share a
00:15:00massive common interest in the prevention of nuclear war. No one in his right
mind in Moscow or in Washington could doubt that proposition. We and they also
share a fundamental obligation to the entire human race, because we and they are
the only two nations who have locked in mortal conflict to raise a serious
question about whether this planet could any longer sustain the human race. And
we and they have a specific and serious obligation under Section 6 of the
Nonproliferation Treaty to make a serious effort to reduce the stockpile of
nuclear weapons, and put serious limits upon the nuclear arms race. Now we
should not suppose--And this relates to you because we are talking about the
00:16:00next forty years that are yours. We should not suppose this previous forty years
is a sure guarantee for the future. We still have to be careful. For example, we
and the Soviet Union must learn not to play games of chicken with each other, to
see how far one side can go in a particular adventure without crossing that
lethal line. Because down that path lies the possibility of miscalculation and
misjudgment, which might bring on catastrophes which neither side could possibly
want. Those of us who served with Chinese forces in Burma during World War II
were sometimes frustrated and a bit amused when we found it at times very
difficult to get a Chinese force completely to surround a Japanese force. And
00:17:00they cited to us an ancient Chinese military doctrine to the effect that you
must never completely surround an enemy, because if you do he will fight too
hard. You must always leave him a route of escape. That doctrine is set forth,
by the way, in a treatise on the arts of war, attributed to Sun Tzu several
hundred years before Christ. Now whatever the problems we've had with that
doctrine in a conventional war, it is a doctrine which takes on rather special
meaning in a nuclear world. I do not believe that we shall have a nuclear war
because the leaders of a nuclear government sit down and make a calm, deliberate
decision to launch such a war.
00:18:00
They all know that that is mutual suicide. But it is just possible that we can
have a nuclear war if a man or a group of men and women find themselves driven
into a corner from which they see no escape, where they lose all sense of stake
in the future and elect to play the role of Samson and pull the temple down
around themselves and everyone else at the same time. It was for that reason
that President Kennedy went to great pains during the Cuban Missile Crisis to
try not to drive Mr. Khrushchev into that kind of corner. And that crisis was
successfully overcome. Then we have to watch, in my judgment, the level of
rhetoric between the two sides. During the first two-and-a-half years of the
[Ronald Wilson] Reagan administration the level of rhetoric between Moscow and
00:19:00Washington rose to very high levels. Well, if that rhetoric becomes too
vitriolic over too sustained a period of time, there is always the possibility
that one side or the other will begin to believe its own rhetoric. And then we
could have some problems. I've been glad to notice that these rhetorical
exchanges have moderated considerably in the last year or two. But we have to be
careful. Now these problems are very much on the minds of world leaders. I've
been asked a number of times about the problem of a Mr. [Moammar] Khadafy
getting and even using nuclear weapons. To me that raises no problem about a
general nuclear holocaust unless you assume that the leaders in Moscow and
00:20:00Washington are idiots. And whatever you might think about them, they are not idiots.
We have talked about this Third World problem with the Soviet Union,
particularly in the negotiation of the Treaty of Nonproliferation of Nuclear
Weapons, on which we and they agreed and have worked jointly very hard, to try
to reduce the spread of these weapons into more and more hands. It is
inconceivable to me that Moscow and Washington would allow the actions of
someone like a Mr. Khadafy to cause us to destroy each other and virtually the
human race. It just won't happen. Nuclear war in my judgment is simply that war
which must not be fought. That war would not only eliminate the answers it would
00:21:00eliminate the questions. Therefore, the question "Why this nuclear weapon and
this nuclear arms race?" The only rational purpose of nuclear weapons, in my
mind, is to see to it that no one else will use nuclear weapons against us. But
that purpose could be achieved with ten percent of present stockpiles, in my
judgment. There is one possible exception to that, and that has to do with the
situation in Europe. We have a substantial number of tactical nuclear weapons in
NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] Europe. If there were an all-out
attack by the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries against western Europe,
they might very shortly find themselves in the areas where these tactical
00:22:00nuclear weapons are to be found. I personally do not believe that any American
president, whatever his political persuasions, would allow Soviet forces to
capture those nuclear weapons. And I think the Soviet leaders know that. But
that is the only exception to the general rule. So I've become, as far as the
future is concerned, very much concerned about finding a way to limit this arms
race. It just is reaching the edges of insanity in its present status. Let us at
least acknowledge that negotiations between us and the Soviet Union on arms
limitation are extraordinarily difficult. To begin with, when we talk to them
about a balance between the two sides, each side tends to look upon this word
00:23:00"balance" like a bank balance. Each side wants a little something positive in
his favor. And so there is inevitably a certain amount of jockeying going on
just on that situation. But the nuclear forces on the two sides are not the
same. And one has to measure different types of nuclear weapons alongside of
each other. And that creates some real problems. And then there are some ghosts
at the table. When you talk bilaterally with the Soviet Union about these
matters you sometimes have the impression that they are looking over their
shoulders at the People's Republic of China, a nation of a billion people armed
with nuclear weapons, with which they share a several-thousand-mile common
frontier. And what might appear to us to be a reasonable balance between us and
the Soviet Union requires, on their side, something extra because of China.
00:24:00
And then there is the problem of the French and British nuclear forces which
have been growing steadily in recent years. It isn't irrational for the Soviet
Union to say that these French and British nuclear weapons must somehow be taken
into account. And I believe at some point we will have to find a way to do just
that, if we are to achieve any lasting arms limitation agreements with the
Soviet Union. And we have had problems over the years on the issue of
verification, partly because I think the Soviets look upon verification as a
unilateral concession which we are asking from them. When they look at us they
see an open society. They see a lot of what they want to know by reading
00:25:00Congressional testimony and technical journals. They see a government that does
not know how to keep its mouth shut. They add a little dash of espionage and
they can know fairly readily what they need to know about us on these matters.
But when we look at them we see a country in which large areas are closed to
foreigners, where there is a government that does know how to keep its mouth
shut, and where espionage in the usual sense is very difficult to maintain. And
so they may not feel the need for the kind of verification as far as we are
concerned that we feel in connection with their situation. But both occasions
are important not just from the point of view of the possibility of military
cheating. Without verification, it would be very difficult to control,
00:26:00particularly in democratic societies, the political storms of fear and suspicion
and hate that arrives over a lack of knowledge about what the other fellow is in
fact doing. For example, on the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty you do not have to sit
around growing ulcers about whether or not the Soviets are complying with that
treaty, because your government can tell you accurately that if the Soviets were
to explode a nuclear weapon in the atmosphere, under water, or in outer space,
we would know about it almost instantly to tell you about it, and then the
government could decide what, if anything, we ought to do under the
circumstances. So verification is difficult with the Soviets.
I must confess that for one who has lived with these matters for a good many
00:27:00years that as far as I am concerned I would go just as far in the elimination of
nuclear weapons as the capabilities of verification would permit. If someone
could show me how you would verify against hiding warheads away in salt mines in
Utah and Siberia, and the U.N. [United Nations] Province of China, I would go
for zero nuclear weapons tomorrow morning at nine o'clock. Because in terms of
the safety of American people, which must be a primary object of policy, it
seems to me that the American people are less safe today than we were before
these weapons were invented. But at the moment I cannot conceive of a method of
verification against the hiding away of warheads. For example, if you think of
warheads and not delivery vehicles, you could put most of the American stockpile
00:28:00of nuclear warheads into this one room. And the opportunities for hiding or
evasion would be almost unlimited. But we need to continue the effort, as
difficult as these discussions are, because we are wasting, as a minimum.
billions upon billions of resources which both societies desperately need for a
lot of other purposes. You have had some discussion from Dorinda [G.] Dallmeyer
of a special problem which has arisen recently. Former Secretary of State
Alexander [Meigs] Haig[, Jr.] said not long ago that he regretted that President
Reagan had made that speech in March of 1983 launching the Strategic Defense
Initiative. I agree with him on that, because by making that speech President
Reagan introduced prematurely a hypothetical obstacle to arms control
00:29:00negotiations. I call it premature and hypothetical because it may well be at
least ten years before we will know whether such space defense weapons are
scientifically and technically possible. But yet they are a political problem
now which perhaps would not have been the case had we simply gone ahead quietly
with research on these matters, which had been going on for some time before
that speech was made. So that's a real difficulty. I support research on these
potential space weapons, partly as a hedge against a breakthrough of the
state-of-the-art by someone else, partly because I see no way to verify a ban on
research, and also because without that research we won't know whether there is
00:30:00anything to quarrel about. We won't know whether this is something in the real
world, or simply a fantasy.
But I have a very different view about the prospects of moving the arms race
into outer space. These defense weapons would cost hundreds of billions of
dollars. And if we succeed in developing such weapons, then we come right up
against the central rationale of the existing Antiballistic Missile Treaty. We
and the Russians agreed, at the end of the Johnson and the beginnings of the
Nixon administrations, that if each side began to deploy defense weapons against
missiles, the inevitable result would simply be a multiplication of offensive
weapons on both sides in order to saturate or penetrate any such defenses. In my
00:31:00judgment, the same thing will happen with these space weapons. Officers of the
Pentagon have already testified before a subcommittee of Congress that if the
Soviets were to develop their own SDI [Strategic Defense Initiative] that we
would have the offensive weapons which could penetrate or evade such defenses.
And just a few days ago Mr. [Mikhail] Gorbachev said that if we went ahead with
this program, that they would multiply their offensive weapons. So we face the
prospect of not only hundreds of billions for the defensive weapons themselves,
but hundreds of billions of new generations of offensive missiles which would be
immune to such defenses. We're talking about a trillion dollar roundtrip at
least. And we need to weigh that over against all the other pressing needs of
our society. Now another President and another Congress will have to make a
00:32:00judgment someday about whether we go down that trail, or whether we seek to
reach an agreement with the Soviet Union, and possibly others, to prevent the
movement of the arms race into outer space. I myself have concluded some remarks
on this subject just a few days ago by saying that the movements of the arms
race into outer space seems to me to be politically inflammable, militarily
futile, economically absurd, and aesthetically repulsive. Other than that, it
seems to me to be a good idea. But these are things which you will have to
decide, because you will be the prime actors when the basic decisions are being
made about what we do in this field. I regret that this issue promises to lead
00:33:00to postponement of serious further agreements in the limitations of arms because
I feel we should get at it, not because I think these increased levels of arms
will automatically result in nuclear war--these weapons won't fire themselves,
or be fired by somebody--but because in order to support the effort made to
continue the arms race, calls will be made upon fear and hate and suspicion on
both sides in order to sustain the effort. And we could do without that. I want
to get to some of your questions. But let me say that I am a veteran of a good
many crises, some of them of desperate seriousness. And based upon that
experience I would say to you that you are going to make it. I have no doubt
00:34:00about it. It won't come automatically, because you face the problem of adding
another forty years to the forty years which my generation is presenting to you.
It will take some thought, some restraint, some sacrifice, some caution. But you
can do it. And I have no doubt that it can be done. In any event, what are your
choices? Your choice is between advancing into the future with a measure of hope
and confidence, working out your own lives in your way, or digging yourself a
foxhole and laying in a supply of drugs, and squatting there shivering, hoping
for an early death. Which choice is more congenial to a member of the human
00:35:00race? Or in this chapel, more appropriate for children of God? I myself have no
doubt about it at all. Now Professor [Loch K.] Johnson will be discussing with
you at your next session, I understand, some of the things which you yourselves
in your own lives can do about these matters. Let me just mention two or three
things that are very much on my mind in this regard.
To begin with, you should be informed and try to separate sense from nonsense.
But you should also give particular thought to the men and women that you elect
to public office, particularly to the White House and to the Senate and House of
Representatives in Washington. It is of greatest importance that the people we
00:36:00send there over the next half-century will be people of intelligence,
conscience, and good practical judgment, thoughtful, moderate in their view of
world affairs, because their responsibilities could become just too dangerous if
we fill those places with the other kind of people. And so I would urge you to
give a lot of thought, whatever your own occupation will be, however you make a
living--to give a lot of thought to the candidates of your choice and what you
might do to help elect better ones rather than worse ones, regardless of the
political party to which you belong. Because these matters are bipartisan in
character and have very little to do with the difference between political
parties. And then to keep in mind the bottom line, which is that whatever we
00:37:00think of the Russians--I don't like them very much--whatever they think of us,
somehow, at the end of the day, we and they must find some way to inhabit this
speck of dust in the universe at the same time. Everything turns upon always
keeping that in mind. And I must confess that I think that fundamental idea came
through at the most recent summit between President Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev.
Eventually you may be driven back to questions of faith. I myself do not believe
that we are on this planet to reach out and grasp the power of the sun itself to
burn ourselves off of it. But that article of faith needs to be translated into
practical politics. There will be times when we shall have to bite our tongues,
00:38:00restrain our tempers, keep under control our glandular reactions. But perhaps we
have no choice, and it may be that civilization itself is largely due to a
process of restraining our desires to give voice to all of our passions, or to
act upon our own passions in every situation. Let me end, before I take your
questions, by saying that I am deeply confident that you will be able to add
another forty years. And that by that time the very thought of using these
dreadful weapons may have become unthinkable. That is what we all have to work
for. Now let's take some of your questions.
00:39:00
QUESTION: What kind of results are coming out of the Summit?
DEAN RUSK: What results are coming out of the Summit? Well, my expectations
ahead of time were rather modest. I thought that if they could meet, shake
hands, exchange dinner, and talk over some things and get away without damage
that that would be a good idea. But they did better than that. I think they
seemed to recognize that very deeply involved are certain common interests on
both sides; some of those I've already mentioned; and that they established a
process of dialogue which I think is very important. We ought to be talking with
the Russians at all levels, not just at the top, but at all levels up and down
the line, so that we could try to avoid unnecessary misunderstandings about what
each other has in mind. Let me give you an example. You may be surprised to hear
00:40:00me say that I myself have never seen any evidence of an intention on the part of
the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies to launch an all-out invasion of
western Europe and attack North America. There are those who talk about such an
intention based upon capabilities. And we should understand this distinction in
our thinking. A troop commander in the field must give great attention to his
enemy's capabilities because the troop command must be able to cope with the
worst that the enemy can do. And so he's got to be ready for that, assuming that
the enemy will want to do his worst. Deriving possible intentions from
capabilities is one thing. Looking for evidence of a serious intention to move
in a particular way is rather a different thing. Now there's another aspect of
00:41:00this that bothers me a bit. The Soviet Union similarly has no evidence of an
intention on the part of the West to attack eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.
They cannot have such evidence because there has never been any such attention.
Dean [Gooderham] Acheson once said that the only thing that NATO cannot do is to
commit aggression. And yet their leaders continue to feed their own people a
barrage of fear of an attack from the West. Since they have no evidence of an
intention by the West to attack the East, or wonders what else they have in mind
with this constant barrage of propaganda. Is it to explain why they have so many
forces among the other countries of eastern Europe? Is it to explain why they
00:42:00are paying so much of their gross national product for military purposes when
the civilian population has so many unfilled demands? Is it to help them explain
why six percent of their population in the Communist party rules the entire
population with a relatively iron hand? I don't know. I don't try to answer that
question. But I'm concerned that they continue to feed this line of thinking to
their own people.
QUESTION: (unintelligible)
DEAN RUSK: Complete nuclear disarmament. One can't be sure in advance. And we
00:43:00do have this difficulty of verification that I mentioned. But the Soviet Union
for many years came into the United Nations proposing resolutions calling for a
general and complete disarmament. We at times went along with those resolutions
with tongue in cheek because we couldn't quite see how we could possibly arrive
at that situation unless the Soviets made some very large changes in their
attitudes toward the rest of the world. But there are those who think that we
should never propose to the Soviet Union something which we think they would
have no chance of accepting. I take a rather different view. We ought to make
these proposals to the Soviet Union, not do their negotiating for them in
advance, and let them decide what their reaction would be. So if we could
find--Again, we have to get back to the problem of verification. But I would be
glad to see as low a level of nuclear weaponry as the processes of verification
00:44:00would permit. And if that goes down to zero, in my judgment so much the better.
Now if two or three of you want to slip down front here and put a few more
questions, I'll be glad to wait a little bit. But we are coming to your
adjournment, and I'll leave it up to Professor Johnson. (applause)
END OF SIDE 1
00:45:00
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