00:00:00RICHARD RUSK: We're interviewing Justice Arthur Goldberg, 1961-62 Secretary
of Labor; '62-65 Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court; '65-68
U.S. Representative to the United Nations; and '77-78 Ambassador at Large. This
is Rich, March 1985, doing the interviewing.
GOLDBERG: I was Secretary of Labor designate, appointed by President Kennedy;
the first time I met your father. I was impressed with the quality of your
father from the start. In '61, before we were sworn in, my wife and I had a
00:01:00brunch for all the new proposed members of the future cabinet. Your dad and your
mother were our ranking guests, and we have been close and dear friends ever
since there.
RICHARD RUSK: I guess you've known my father in three or four different roles.
You were Secretary of Labor and Associate Justice of the Supreme Court and
American Ambassador to the United Nations. So you've know my father in different
ways. Perhaps we can start with you as Secretary of Labor and your relationship
with my dad at that point in your career.
GOLDBERG: Your father and I as cabinet officers enjoyed the closest possible
relationship. Your father being a man totally devoted to his country, never
00:02:00worried about guarding his turf, which is a common failing of cabinet officers
and government bureaucrats. For example, there were trade negotiations with
Japan, in which our textile and men's clothing unions were importantly involved
and concerned. President Kennedy had the view that the State Department wasn't
getting anywhere and was insensitive to the concerns of the labor movement and
he asked would I take hold? I said, "No. Not unless I talk to the Secretary of
State and am assured of his agreement." I spoke to your father. Your father
said, "Thank God! If you can work something out it would be great." That was
00:03:00characteristic of your father, who was a rare public official, not worried about
protecting his turf.
RICHARD RUSK: Was that the language that he used?
GOLDBERG: Yes. "Please do." And I worked something out and your father was
delighted. That was characteristic of him. No jealousy. Nothing of that sort.
The object, he recognized, was to serve our government and he understood that
with my former connections with the labor union I probably could do more than
officials in the State Department, which I did; and he was very grateful.
RICHARD RUSK: Were there other issues and other occasions where the two of you
came together?
GOLDBERG: We went to Japan together in the first cabinet meeting with the
Japanese after the Japanese publicly protested a visit by President Eisenhower.
Your father was head of our delegation. We went as a delegation. Your father and
00:04:00mother would not sleep in the sole bedroom on the plane Air Force One. Luther
[Hartwell] Hodges [Jr.] was the oldest man in our group; he was Secretary of
Commerce. He insisted that Secretary and Mrs. Hodges sleep on the sole bed
during this long flight. He sat up with the rest of us. Further, at the
conference he presided for our side. The Japanese were particularly interested
in labor objections to their imports. When they would turn to me, he would say,
on this subject, Secretary of Labor Goldberg is our authority and negotiator.
This led the media to report, rather erroneously, that I was the most important
member of the American delegation. This was not resented by your father. For him
00:05:00the priority was how best to serve our country in these negotiations.
RICHARD RUSK: Thank you a lot. I appreciate it. I guess your disagreements with
my dad did not take place until Vietnam? Did you have any disagreements before?
GOLDBERG: Well, we had some disagreements. I don't want to paint an entirely
rosy picture. Your dad and I did not see eye to eye on the Middle East even
before I left Kennedy. I had my views; he had his. And we frankly expressed our
differing opinions to the President. But there was never any animosity. Your
father had been an Assistant Secretary in charge of the Middle East. But I
should like to think I had a more realistic conception of what could and could
00:06:00not be done. That may not be so, but I thought it was. Well, I never hesitated
to express myself to the President, and your dad never resented it.
RICHARD RUSK: Did the Kennedy cabinet as a cabinet group get into much
substance on the issues of foreign policy and advise the President and my
father, as a group, on foreign affairs?
GOLDBERG: Not very much.
RICHARD RUSK: Did the accounts that I read as a student, for example, that said
that the meetings in the cabinet are more ceremonial--
GOLDBERG: This is true, particularly in foreign affairs and defense matters.
However, Kennedy did consult several of us in whom he had complete confidence:
your father, [Robert Francis] Bobby Kennedy, [Robert Strange] McNamara, and me.
An earmark of your father's attitude is best illustrated by an example. Bob
McNamara is a real good friend of mine. But when I went around settling the
00:07:00missile strikes which were prejudicing our defense effort--I found things wrong
and reported the situation as I saw it, frankly. Bob didn't like my doing so,
even though we were and are friends. Your father never reacted that way. It
sounds like I'm extolling his virtues, but I'm going to say a few things that
are not as praiseworthy.
RICHARD RUSK: That's fine. I hope you'll be as candid as possible. I realize
it's difficult for some of you to be fully candid, perhaps, in view of the fact
that I'm family.
GOLDBERG: I will try to be, but before doing so, I should like to point out
another aspect of your father's tolerance and sophistication. Well, when I was
on the Supreme Court I decided, I think, ten cases against your father's
00:08:00department. An example is the case of Aptheker v. Rusk, striking down State
Department restrictions on the right to travel abroad. You think that affected
our relationship? The answer is no. He recognized that neither of us has a
monopoly on wisdom. Shall we now talk about the United Nations?
RICHARD RUSK: Yeah.
GOLDBERG: Your father is a great U.N. man, perhaps too much so, because of his
early associations with the world organizations.
RICHARD RUSK: Right: a real believer in the United Nations.
GOLDBERG: Yeah. When I left the Supreme Court to the U.N., we had some
understandings. The basic one was that I represented the President and was not
00:09:00an official of the Department of State. Further, I had cabinet rank, next in
protocol to your father. In fact, during state of the union messages we walked
in and sat side by side.
RICHARD RUSK: And you made this clear at the beginning of your relationship?
GOLDBERG: Yes. And your father understood it too: I was not in the State
Department; I was the President's representative. As a courtesy I would advise
your father as to developments, and he rarely interfered in the conduct of my
mission. Did this cause a rupture between us? No. No. You see, we had some
periodic meetings with the President. Your father would express his viewpoint. I
would likewise. Sometimes my view prevailed; sometimes his prevailed. Our
differences were articulated with great respect. I blame your father for two
things: He, in'67, thought he ought to disqualify himself for our position at
the U.N. because he previously had been Secretary of State in Middle Eastern
00:10:00Affairs and he had said some things which he thought might prejudice our
relationship with Israel. His statements were somewhat anti-Israel. He thought,
therefore, he should disqualify himself.
RICHARD RUSK: Disqualify himself in what way?
GOLDBERG: Not to participate in decision making. So President Johnson said,
"You take charge," to me.
RICHARD RUSK: He told you to take charge? Are you talking about the six-day war
in 1967?
GOLDBERG: Yes. '67--and your father did not object.
RICHARD RUSK: And you took charge of the American position?
GOLDBERG: Of everything; I ran it.
RICHARD RUSK: Our policy during the sixties?
GOLDBERG: Total policy and foreign policy, subject, of course, to the President.
RICHARD RUSK: Not just the United Nations issues?
GOLDBERG: No. The officials at the State Departmen, Joe Sisco, Assistant
Secretary for International Affairs, was ordered to take orders from me. He
acted as my assistant. Any rub? My second complaint is that your father is too
00:11:00much a loyalist. I heard this from Kennedy himself. Bobby didn't like your
father, you know that.
RICHARD RUSK: Were you close to Robert Kennedy?
GOLDBERG: Not as close as President Kennedy.
RICHARD RUSK: Do you have any insights on Robert Kennedy's relationship with my dad?
GOLDBERG: Not very much, but Bobby didn't exactly take to your father and vice versa.
RICHARD RUSK: No, they didn't care much for each other.
GOLDBERG: Your father never said that to me. But I had heard. I think Bobby
never understood that your father had a top flight intellect, which he has to
00:12:00this day. And in foreign policy, not an exact science, one may agree or
disagree. I disagreed. I disagreed on Vietnam. Bobby attributed this to over
loyalty, not speaking up. I never agreed with Bobby Kennedy. I think that your
father's view represented his real convictions.
RICHARD RUSK: On Vietnam?
GOLDBERG: Yes.
RICHARD RUSK: I'm sure they did.
GOLDBERG: I saw a little item in the press recently that rather disappointed
me. Your father sort of waffled. That was not like him.
RICHARD RUSK: At what time was this, now? Waffled?
GOLDBERG: I thought I saw it in the newspaper. Maybe it was a bad report.
RICHARD RUSK: Just recently?
GOLDBERG: Yeah. Fairly recently. Some symposium he engaged in. It was always my
conviction that it wasn't just loyalty to the President. I shared with him that
00:13:00a President is entitled to due deference. But I think by nature I am more direct
and outspoken and I have overawed my President. I don't think he was. I think
what he said represented his view.
RICHARD RUSK: I think so. He doesn't have any doubts now. He's as firm a
believer in the premises and the assumptions that went into that policy as back
when he was secretary. The only doubts that he has had have been more of a
tactical nature.
GOLDBERG: If he has doubts now then it's second thoughts.
RICHARD RUSK: Right, but not on the premises of our commitment.
GOLDBERG: Because at the time he was pretty vigilant, you know, and direct,
that it was the right policy. I didn't think it was. There was the difference.
00:14:00And I disagreed. But again, it was on the level of two people, one of whom--I
might be wrong; he might be wrong. Who knows in foreign policy? I once was
terribly put out with your father, when the Pueblo incident happened. I didn't
want to repeat Adlai Stevenson's fiasco, not knowing what was going on. So I
00:15:00insisted that the National Security Agency, give me the tapes which we had
intercepted from the North Vietnamese. They showed that that ship was foolishly
as close as only thirteen miles away, but nevertheless in international waters.
Why the hell was it thirteen? It could have been twenty. Now at breakfast,
between your father, McNamara, myself, and Johnson, I said, "You want to get in
another war?" Johnson said, "Absolutely not." I said, "Then let me handle it at
the U.N. We'll demonstrate to satisfy the American people that the Pueblo was in
00:16:00international waters. Ultimately we will negotiate the release of our men who
had been captured. We'll never get the boat back, but we'll negotiate the
release." The Pueblo had an incompetent commander. It was the first time in
American history where a commander on the naval vessel did not shoot before
striking his colors. But then President Johnson, who could not resist overkill,
had your father and McNamara get on television. And because they were being very
careful and had not listened to the North Korean tapes as I did, had this
question put to them: "Are you sure that the Pueblo was in international
waters?" They replied, "Well, you can't be sure, we think it was." This is after
I made a big show that it was. And I knew it was.
00:17:00
RICHARD RUSK: It was in international waters?
GOLDBERG: I had listened to the tapes; they hadn't. I was furious with them.
RICHARD RUSK: I think what I'm going to ask you to do is just keep going with
your impressions, the key things, the anecdotes, important things, and I'd like
to come back later with some questions.
GOLDBERG: Well, I also was a little put out with him because my leaving the
Supreme Court and going was based upon the fact that I would be a leading factor
about the Vietnam War.
RICHARD RUSK: Vietnam War, yeah. You left with that condition?
GOLDBERG: Yes. I did not know that there were Tuesday meetings going on with
your father, McNamara, and the President, and then periodic meetings of the so-
called "wise men" until after Tet, when I was called to such a meeting. Before
then, I wrote Johnson that he had lost the consent of the governed. Johnson got
angry, but President Johnson thought it over and invited me to a meeting of the
so-called "wise men."
00:18:00
RICHARD RUSK: When, approximately, did you leave the Supreme Court?
GOLDBERG: I left the Supreme Court in '65, July.
RICHARD RUSK: So you went for nearly three years without playing a major role
in the decision making.
GOLDBERG: In part, I was told I was playing a major role. I was given
permission to try to bring it to the U.N. I was sent on a peace mission. I had
all the indicia of playing a major role without real substance. However, the
President and your father should have been entirely frank with me.
RICHARD RUSK: And you took that United Nations position on the assumption and
with the provision that you would have the major influence in Vietnam decision making?
GOLDBERG: Yes.
RICHARD RUSK: When did you first have doubts about the war? From the start?
GOLDBERG: Yes. I didn't see our national interest involved and I was convinced
that we were fighting the war in the wrong place and wrong restraints on our
armed forces. Also, we were placing too much reliance on our air force.
RICHARD RUSK: Yeah. My dad was not receptive to you nor your views on the Vietnam
00:19:00
GOLDBERG: He always listened.
RICHARD RUSK: He did?
GOLDBERG: But he stood by the President. And I attribute it primarily to his
conviction, but also to his loyalty.
RICHARD RUSK: Were you advising with him or talking with him on Vietnam throughout?
GOLDBERG: Yes we always talked.
RICHARD RUSK: Including 1968?
GOLDBERG: Yes. It was only because of your father I didn't leave the U.N., by
the way, when I resigned April '68. He called me; Johnson was reluctant. Your
father said, "The Nonproliferation Treaty has to go through the Assembly. It's
00:20:00important." I said, "I agree." "I'm told that you are the key to its adoption.
Will you stay on and steer it through?" And for patriotic reasons since nuclear
weapons were involved, and my respect for your father, I stayed until July.
That's when I resigned.
RICHARD RUSK: Go ahead and continue with your impressions, both of a positive--
GOLDBERG: Your father's a rather shy person, do you know that?
RICHARD RUSK: Yes he is. And isn't that fantastic, given the positions that he
has held and his stature?
GOLDBERG: Yes. Also his ability to articulate before Congress. He saved my face
once. I negotiated the space treaty myself. I was in South Vietnam. I had jet
00:21:00lag. I was absolutely out and had to testify before Congress in support of the
Treaty. And for the first time in my life, I wasn't myself. Your father,
however, came to my rescue. He pulled it out.
00:22:00
RICHARD RUSK: Tell me about that.
GOLDBERG: Well, in the testimony I was in countless appearances before
Congress. I was absolutely beat.
RICHARD RUSK: He came in there with you and testified?
GOLDBERG: And he quietly pulled it out. And I have always been grateful to him.
RICHARD RUSK: I've got a question for you about the Tet offensive and the
policy review at the Tet offensive.
GOLDBERG: Yes.
RICHARD RUSK: There's been a number of conflicting accounts--
GOLDBERG: It isn't much conflict. Your father can remember Tet.
RICHARD RUSK: We talked about it.
GOLDBERG: The review of Tet was the first time I was invited to the Nine Wise Men.
RICHARD RUSK: You didn't go to the first one then?
GOLDBERG: I never knew it existed. President Johnson never told me. But after I
wrote that he had lost the consent of the government, after his initial anger he
00:23:00invited me to a meeting of the Wise Men. I attended the meeting, and lo and
behold I saw a whole galaxy: Dean Acheson, Jack [John J.] McCloy, Doug [Clarence
Douglas] Dillon, George [Wildman] Ball, Clark [McAdams] Clifford, General [Omar
Nelson] Bradley, General [Matthew] Ridg way, your father, and some others.
00:24:00General [William Childs] Westmoreland sent his intelligence officer. He gave an
update as did the deputy director of the CIA and Ambassador Habib. It was a
great victory. As you probably know, I served in OSS [Office of Strategic
Services] in World War II. I was a civilian officer in OSS. Westmoreland's
intelligence officer gave a briefing saying that Tet was a famous victory but
his figures about enemy dead and casualties did not add up. And I turned to
General Matt Ridgway, who was sitting next to me, and said, "General, can I
00:25:00point out an obvious discrepancy in the figures?" He said, "Yes." So, I asked
00:26:00three simple questions. I said, "How many effectives do you think the North and
South Vietnamese had at Tet?" "Two hundred thousand." (I'm guessing about the
exact figures after these many years, but the point is the same.) Then I said,
"How many did we kill?" He said, "Two hundred thousand." I then said, "You said
there were only two hundred thousand enemy effectives, that we killed two
hundred thousand and seriously wounded one hundred thousand. This being the
case, my final question is, who are we fighting?" There was silence--
[break in recording]
00:27:00
RICHARD RUSK: The Tet Offensive and the policy review after the Tet
Offensive--there have been some conflicting stories as to exactly--
GOLDBERG: Well, I can really answer very simply. CBS [Columbia Broadcasting
System] called me. They had read this story somewhere. Where was it? I guess
[David] Halberstam's book.
RICHARD RUSK: Halberstam had it in his book. That's right.
GOLDBERG: I don't know where he got it. I didn't tell him. He got it from
someone. After all, it was a big group which, by the way, changed their mind
that day. Anyhow, CBS called me and said, "Is this a true story?" I said, "Yes,
substantially." "Can we subpoena you as a witness?" I said, "If you subpoena me
I, of course, will have to comply. However, on cross-examination I will testify
that I don't believe there was a conspiracy. I believe President Johnson knew
00:28:00everything that was going on." CBS did not subpoena me.
RICHARD RUSK: He did. Townsend [Walter] Hoopes wrote a book called The Limits
of Intervention in which he claims that Clark Clifford played a decisive role
with Lyndon Johnson in turning the policy around.
GOLDBERG: He had been a hawk but partially changed his mind.
RICHARD RUSK: My father's only biographer, Warren Cohen said my dad was very
influential with the President. My dad has said that Lyndon Johnson himself was
ready to move on his own.
GOLDBERG: I don't know.
RICHARD RUSK: Do you have any idea the relative weights of influence?
GOLDBERG: I cannot answer because I was not in Washington. I participated in
that meeting and then following the meeting met with the President and others
the following day at either lunch or dinner with Dr. Schapino of Boston, an old
friend who is reputed to be the greatest ophthalmologist in the world. It seemed
obvious then that the President was changing his mind. But the Nine Wise Men
previously changed their minds.
00:29:00
RICHARD RUSK: I guess that group really had a decisive influence on him.
GOLDBERG: Perhaps so. I did not approve of Clark Clifford's proposal to confine
the bombing behind the 19th parallel. It was my view that we should withdraw
with dignity rather than prolong the agony. And it was prolonged for three to
four years with consequent casualties.
RICHARD RUSK: You bet. Well, I want to thank you for the time you gave me. And
we'll do it again at your convenience.
GOLDBERG: You're going back home?
RICHARD RUSK: I'm going back--I'm going to New York Saturday morning.
GOLDBERG: Tell your dad if he wants what I regard to be the best man to examine
his eye problem, I shall be glad to arrange an appointment.
RICHARD RUSK: Well thanks for your concern. I'll tell him.
00:30:00
END OF SIDE 1
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